Conservative bounds for the pfd of a 1-out-of-2 software-based system based on an assessor’s subjective probability of “not worse than independence” by Littlewood, B. & Povyakalo, A. A.
Littlewood, B. & Povyakalo, A. A. (2013). Conservative bounds for the pfd of a 1-out-of-2 software-
based system based on an assessor’s subjective probability of “not worse than independence”. IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering,
City Research Online
Original citation: Littlewood, B. & Povyakalo, A. A. (2013). Conservative bounds for the pfd of a 1-
out-of-2 software-based system based on an assessor’s subjective probability of “not worse than 
independence”. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering,
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/2514/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Conservative bounds for the pfd  of a 1-out-of-2 software-
based system based on an assessor’s subjective probability of 
“not worse than independence”  
 
Bev Littlewood, Andrey Povyakalo 
Centre for Software Reliability, City University, London EC1V 0HB 
Abstract 
We consider the problem of assessing the reliability of a 1-out-of-2 software-based 
system, in which failures of the two channels cannot be assumed to be independent 
with certainty. An informal approach to this problem assesses the channel pfds 
(probabilities of failure on demand) conservatively and then multiplies these together 
in the hope that the conservatism will be sufficient to overcome any possible 
dependence between the channel failures. Our intention here is to place this kind of 
reasoning on a formal footing. We introduce a notion of “not worse than 
independence” and assume that an assessor has a prior belief about this, expressed as 
a probability. We obtain a conservative prior system pfd, and show how a 
conservative posterior system pfd can be obtained following the observation of a 
number of demands without system failure. We present some illustrative numerical 
examples, discuss some of the difficulties involved in this way of reasoning, and 
suggest some avenues of future research. 
KEY WORDS: System reliability; Software fault tolerance; 1-out-of-2 system; 
Dependent failures; Subjective probability. 
 
1  Background 
We consider the problem of assessing the reliability of a 1-out-of-2 system in which 
the two software-based channels are “diverse” as a result of having been developed 
independently of one another (indeed, their designs may have been forced to be 
diverse by imposing diverse development procedures upon their designers). Such 
design-diverse fault tolerant systems have been used successfully in some safety 
critical applications: see (Littlewood, Popov et al. 2002; Wood, Belles et al. 2010).  
Whilst there is some general evidence that this kind of design-diverse fault tolerance 
is a good way of achieving high reliability – for example from experiments – there are 
serious difficulties in assessing the reliability of a particular system. An important 
problem arises from the fact that we can never be certain that the channels in such a 
system will fail independently: so for a 1-out-of-2 system we cannot simply multiply 
together the channel pfds to obtain the system pfd. In several experiments – see e.g. 
(Knight and Leveson 1986; Eckhardt, Caglayan et al. 1991) – “independently” 
developed software versions (channels) were shown to fail dependently. In fact there 
was a tendency for the dependence to be positive, i.e. the versions failed together 
more frequently than would have been the case if failures were independent. Even in 
these experiments, however, there was on average some benefit gained from the use 
of multiple channels (compared with single versions) (Knight and Leveson 1986), 
even if this was not as great as it would have been under independence. 
Conservative bounds for the pfd of a 1-out-of-2 system 2 
 
 
The experimental results were confirmed in some contemporary theoretical modeling, 
which also provided a conceptual framework for understanding reasons for failure 
dependence (Eckhardt and Lee 1985; Littlewood and Miller 1989). The basic idea 
introduced by Eckhardt and Lee is that “problem difficulty” varies over the demand 
space: some demands are “intrinsically harder” than others. That is, it is harder to 
build a program that executes such a demand correctly (i.e. the chance of a particular 
program doing so is smaller). If channel A fails on a randomly selected demand, one 
should conclude that this was probably a difficult demand and thus the chance of 
channel B failing on the same demand is greater than it otherwise would be: i.e. this 
conditional probability of B failing is great than B’s marginal pfd. The result is that 
there is positive association between channel failures, and the 1-out-of-2 system pfd is 
greater than it would be if independence of failures could be assumed.  
Littlewood and Miller generalize this result to the case where diversity is forced by 
employing deliberately different “methodologies” to develop A and B. In this case the 
variation of difficulty for A will generally be different from that of B: demands that 
are hard for B may be easier for A and vice versa. It is shown that in this case the 
association between channel failures can be either positive or negative – i.e. it is 
possible to do better than the case of independence (the 1-out-of-2 system pfd can be 
smaller than the product of the two channel pfds). Whether it is practically feasible to 
force the methodologies to be sufficiently different that the channels exhibit such 
negatively associated failure behaviour remains a moot point. If it is possible, it is 
unlikely that one could be certain that negative association of failures had been 
achieved for a particular pair of channels. 
In summary, then, the position is this. Whilst there is evidence that this approach may 
be effective – in some average sense – in achieving system reliability, it is difficult to 
assess the reliability of a particular design-diverse system. This is because the level of 
association between the failures of the diverse channels will not be known – in 
particular it cannot be assumed that they will fail independently. These problems of 
assessment are important because they are a barrier to the use of what is otherwise 
one of the most promising approaches to very high system reliability.1  
An interesting way around this difficulty arose in some discussions the authors had 
with engineers involved in the licensing of a 2-channel, 1-out-of-2 protection system. 
The pfd of the system was required to be no worse than 10-6. It was expected that there 
would be extensive analysis of the “diversity-seeking” decisions involved in the 
designs of the two channels, so it may be reasonable to conclude that any dependence 
between the channel failure processes would be modest. The pfd claims for the two 
channels – 10-4 and 10-2 – were believed to be very conservative, sufficiently so that 
taking the product of these, it was claimed, would give a conservative value for the 
system pfd even in the possible presence of some positive dependence between the 
channels.  
The difficulty with this kind of reasoning, we think, is that it makes a trade-off 
between very different things: pessimism in channel claims against optimism in 
                                                
1  Although it should be said that other approaches to achieving high reliability also pose great difficulties in 
assessing what has been achieved in a particular instance. In fact, many claims for the efficacy of software 
engineering processes concern their “on average” performance, and what is achieved in a particular instance 
can be very different from this average. Also, it must be admitted that the empirical support, even for these 
average effects, is often weak. 
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claims about joint failure behaviour. It seems reasonable to ask how optimistic the 
independence claim is (i.e. how dependent the channel failures actually are) and how 
pessimistic the channel claims are – and then to ask whether the latter is sufficient to 
overcome the former. A more subtle critique of this kind of reasoning would ask for 
confidence in claims to be made explicit (and preferably quantitative): e.g. what 
confidence could be placed in the system pfd claim of 10-6 given particular evidence 
of trade-off between pessimism about channel claims and optimism about channel 
dependence? This issue of “confidence” is often neglected in claims about even life-
critical systems: for example, standards such as IEC16508:2010 treat the reliability 
levels (such as pfds) associated with Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) as if these could 
be claimed with certainty. See (Bloomfield and Littlewood 2003) for a discussion of 
the wider issues here. 
In the work reported here we aim to put this kind of “trade-off” reasoning on a more 
rigorous footing in order to make conservative claims for multi-channel systems in 
the presence of likely channel failure dependency.  We begin with a brief examination 
of the nature of “association”, or dependency, between channel failures, with the 
intent of explicitly modeling the uncertainty here. 
Figure 1 illustrates the spectrum of possible dependence between channel failures. It 
ranges from a best case where there are no coincident failures (the failure regions of 
the input space for channel A and channel B are disjoint), to a worst case where all 
failures are coincident (the failure regions are identical). It is clear from the figure that 
independence is a very special case: it is just one point in the “middle” of this 
spectrum.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 The spectrum of possible association between channel failures of a 1-out-of-2 diverse 
system. 
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For a particular pair of channels, there will be a point on the spectrum, x, that 
represents the degree of association between failures of that pair. We might express 
this numerically, for example, as the ratio pfdAB/pfdA.pfdB. 
The important point is that there is uncertainty about the value of x: an assessor could 
not be certain that x took a particular point value on the spectrum. It is appropriate, 
therefore, to treat x as a random variable, and an assessor can be expected to have 
some prior beliefs about it (such beliefs might be based, for example, on knowledge 
of how the two channels were developed). As is often the case, it seems unlikely that 
an assessor would be able to state a complete prior distribution for x. We propose to 
examine the case where the assessor can tell us a single point on this distribution, 
specifically his probability that x is not greater than 1. This is his confidence that the 
association of channel failures is not positive in Figure 1 (that pfdAB is not greater than 
pfdA.pfdB), i.e. channel failures are not worse than independent (NWTI).  
Notice that in this case the assessor is expressing his belief about x as a probability 
associated with an interval on the spectrum of dependence. This seems more 
reasonable than associating a probability with a point on the spectrum – in particular 
with the “independence” point, x=1. We might be prepared to regard as reasonable an 
assessor’s claim of the kind “I am 90% sure that x is no greater than 1”, but not a 
claim such as “I am 90% sure that x=1”. More formally, we assume that the 
distribution representing his belief about x is absolutely continuous, and thus has zero 
probability mass at a point. 
We believe that the most convincing use for the results in the rest of the paper lies in 
allowing assessors (or, more importantly, assessors of assessors, such as regulators) to 
challenge claims based on the informal trade-off arguments described above: “If your 
channel claims are pessimistic by this amount, and you have seen this amount of 
failure-free testing, then it follows that your doubt in NWTI needs to be smaller than 
this”.  
2 Model based on an assessor’s level of confidence that “channel 
failures are not worse than independent” 
The basic idea here is similar to that we proposed in (Bishop, Bloomfield et al. 2011). 
In that paper it was shown how to obtain a conservative pfd for a single channel based 
on an assessor’s limited prior belief, together with some failure-free operational 
testing. It is well-known that people find it hard to express their subjective prior belief 
as a complete distribution for an unknown parameter (in this case channel pfd). 
Instead, in this work it was assumed that the assessor was only able to state a single 
percentile (i.e. single point on the abscissa of his subjective cumulative distribution) 
for his prior belief about the channel pfd: thus he might just be able to say, for 
example, “I am 90% confident that the pfd is smaller than 10-3”, more generally 
provide a single pair of numbers (x, y) representing his subjective probability (1-x) 
that the pfd is smaller than y. 
There will in general be an infinite number of distributions, satisfying such a single 
percentile constraint, which would be candidates to represent the assessor’s complete 
prior belief about pfd (if he were able to express this). It is easy to see that, of all such 
complete prior distributions that satisfy the percentile constraint, the one that gives 
most conservative mean pfd is a simple 2-point distribution: see Figure 2. In the case 
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of the example of the previous paragraph, this distribution is the one that places 90% 
of the probability at 10-3 and the remaining 10% at 1. 
More surprisingly, it was also shown that following seeing the execution of some 
demands without failure, another 2-point prior distribution (one satisfying the 
assessor’s percentile constraint) gives the most conservative posterior mean pfd. The 
interpretation of this is that the assessor can treat this value as a conservative bound 
for his true probability of failure on demand – for example in a wider safety case. 
 
 
Figure 2: from (Bishop, Bloomfield et al. 2011). At top is an ideal complete distribution for an 
assessor’s belief. However, he is unable to express the infinite number of probabilities implicit 
in this figure, and can only give us a single percentile (x, y) of the distribution: i.e. the area, x, to 
the right of a single point, y. Below is the most pessimistic of all possible distributions, f(p), that 
satisfy his expressed belief: it is obtained by placing all the probability masses associated with 
the intervals (0, y) and (y, 1) at the extreme right of the intervals (note that the bars here 
represent probability mass, in contrast to the probability density function in the upper figure). 
 
In the current work we reason similarly; the difference is that we are now reasoning 
about the pfd of a 1-out-of-2 system made up of two channels A and B. We begin, for 
simplicity, by assuming that the channel pfds are known with certainty: pfdA, pfdB. 
This assumption can later be relaxed by using the results of (Bishop, Bloomfield et al. 
2011) upon each channel. So the only uncertainty concerns the degree of association 
between the failures of channel A and channel B. The assessor’s confidence – his prior 
probability – that there is not positive association between channel failures (NWTI) is 
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1-dAB(0). That is, the probability dAB(0) is the assessor’s doubt, expressed as a 
probability, that the channel failures are independent or better2.  
That is, the assessor’s prior distribution, f(p), for the system probability of failure, 
PFDAB3, has a 1− dAB (0)( )×100 percentile at pfdA.pfdB , i.e.: 
f (p)dp =
0
pfdA . pfdB
∫ P(PFDAB ≤ pfdA.pfdB ) =1− dAB (0)      (1) 
We also assume initially, without loss of generality, that pfdA ≤ pfdB. Since we know 
that the probability of failure of a 1-out-of-2 system cannot be worse than the best 
channel pfd, we also have: 
f (p)dp =
0
pfdA
∫ P(PFDAB ≤ pfdA ) =1        (2) 
which gives a second percentile of f(p). We thus have two percentiles of the assessor’s 
prior distribution for the system’s probability of failure on demand, PFDAB. In 
general, there will be an infinite number of potential prior probability density 
functions, f(p), that satisfy (1) and (2). It is easy to see that the most pessimistic of 
these is the 2-point distribution that has probability mass at pfdA.pfdB (with probability 
1–dAB(0)), and probability mass at pfdA (with probability dAB(0)). The reasoning here 
exactly parallels that in (Bishop, Bloomfield et al. 2011), described earlier: the most 
pessimistic 2-point distribution is one that moves the probability mass in the intervals 
(0, pfdA.pfdB) and (pfdA.pfdB, pfdA) as far to the right as possible (i.e. to the right hand 
end of each interval). 
Since the assessor’s probability that the system fails on a randomly selected demand 
is just the mean of his (in this case, prior) distribution of PFDAB, we have: 
P(system fails on randomly selected demand)
= E(PFDAB | 0 failure-free tests observed) = pfdAB (0), say
= p. f (p)dp
0
1
∫
 
€ 
≤ pfdA .pfdB(1− dAB(0))+ pfdA .dAB(0)        (3) 
This bound is the value that the assessor can treat as his true (prior) probability of 
failure of the system on a randomly selected demand, and be assured that it is a 
conservative (although attainable) number. 
Of course, this prior bound may not be of practical value – it may be very 
conservative for reasonable values of dAB(0). However, as in the case of a single 
system (Bishop, Bloomfield et al. 2011), things become more interesting and useful 
when evidence is available of extensive failure-free working of the 1-out-of-2 system. 
                                                
2  The notation here anticipates the more general one we require later in the paper, when we show how such 
confidence/doubt changes as a result of seeing N failure-free demands. Here N=0. 
3  We shall use, as far as possible, upper case letters to indicate random variables, and lower case letters to 
represent their realisations. 
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When N demands have been executed by the system, and no failures have been seen4, 
the assessor’s belief about PFDAB changes from his prior distribution, f(p), via Bayes’ 
theorem. His posterior distribution is 
f (p | N  failure-free demands) =
(1− p)N f (p)
(1− p)N f (p)dp
0
1
∫
     (4) 
The assessor’s posterior probability of failure on a randomly selected demand is the 
mean of this distribution: 
€ 
P(System fails on randomly selected demand | N failure - free demands)
= E(PFD
AB
| N failure - free demands)
 
=
p(1− p)N f (p)dp
0
1
∫
(1− p)N f (p)dp
0
1
∫
         (5) 
The question now is which, of the infinite number of prior density functions f that 
satisfy (1) and (2), are the most pessimistic, i.e. maximize (5). In general there will be 
an infinite number of these. We can show that, once again, one of these is a 2-point 
distribution; i.e. this distribution has the same posterior expectation as the (many) 
other most pessimistic priors. This distribution has probability mass concentrated at 
pfdA.pfdB, as before, and probability mass concentrated at a point zAB(N), where zAB(N) 
is the value of z that maximizes the posterior mean: 
€ 
F
AB
(z) = E(PFD
AB
| N failure - free demands) 
=
pfdApfdB (1− pfdApfdB )
N
(1− dAB (0))+ z(1− z)
N
dAB (0)
(1− pfdApfdB )
N
(1− dAB (0))+ (1− z)
N
dAB (0)
    (6) 
The conservative “true” system pfd is then the value (6) takes at its maximum, i.e. 
€ 
E(PFD
AB
| N failure - free demands) ≤ F
AB
(z
AB
(N ))      (7) 
€ 
= pfdAB(N ),  say          (8) 
The assessor’s doubt that the failures of the two channels are NWTI changes as he 
observes N failure-free demands, from his prior belief dAB(0) to posterior: 
€ 
dAB(N ) =
(1− zAB(N ))
N
dAB(0)
(1− pfdA pfdB )
N
(1− dAB(0))+ (1− zAB(N ))
N
dAB(0)
    (9) 
in an obvious notation. The conservative posterior distribution of the system pfd, (4), 
is a 2-point distribution with probability mass (1-dAB(N)) at the “independence” point, 
pfdA.pfdB, and probability mass dAB(N) at zAB(N), which has the mean given by (7). For 
proof of these statements, see Appendix. 
The reader should note that “conservative” here refers only to the mean value of the 
system pfd: from the infinite number of prior distributions that satisfy the assessor’s 
                                                
4  Note we are assuming at this point that only system successes/failures are observed, and not the individual 
channel outcomes. That is, we are treating the system as a “black box”. 
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expressed beliefs, (1) and (2), there is none that gives a larger posterior mean pfd than 
(8). The “conservative” posterior distribution here may not be conservative in other 
respects. For example, it has no probability mass to the right of the point zAB(N), 
which many assessors might regard as too optimistic. 
3 Practical implications of the model: Examples 
Consider the following simple illustrative example. Assume that pfdA = pfdB = 10-3, 
the initial doubt, dAB(0) = 0.1, and that we see 2000 failure-free demands, i.e. N = 
2000. We have: 
pfdAB(0) ~1 10-4, from (3) 
pfdAB(2000) = 2.063 10-5 
dAB(2000) = 0.0365 
zAB(2000) = 0.00054 
What has happened here – are these results useful? Clearly, the assessor’s 
conservative “true” prior system probability of failure on demand, at approximately 
10-4, is not a very useful improvement on the single channel pfds. However, the 
conservative “true” posterior system probability of failure on demand, pfdAB(2000), is 
almost two orders of magnitude better than the crude bound 10-3 (the probability of 
failure of the best channel). It is also considerably better than the “black-box” 99% 
confidence bound 2.65 10-3, which is obtained by treating the system as a single black 
box about which nothing is known except that it has survived 2000 demands without 
failure (Littlewood and Wright 1997). 
Furthermore, confidence in “no worse than independence” of A, B channel failures 
has increased to over 0.96 from the assessor’s original 0.90. The right hand point, z, 
of the conservative 2-point distribution has moved to the left, closer to the 
“independence” point pfdA.pfdB.  
In general, the final (conservative) claim for system pfd depends upon: the channel 
probabilities of failure on demand, pfdA, pfdB; the prior doubt, dAB(0), about the 
channel failures being no worse than independent; the number of failure-free system 
demands, N, that have been seen. One way the results of Section 2 could be used 
would be to see whether any points in this (pfdA, pfdB, dAB(0), N) space seem feasible. 
For example, given the values of pfdA, pfdB, dAB(0), we could see how many test cases 
need to be executed (and show no failures) to obtain a particular value of pfdAB(N): in 
many cases, such as reactor protection systems, the cost of generating test cases may 
be high so that a large N may be infeasible. Alternatively, given the values of pfdA, 
pfdB, N (where here N is regarded as the size of the largest practically feasible test 
set), we could calculate the required dAB(0) and ask whether such a belief could be 
trusted (for example, supported by evidence about the diversity-seeking decisions 
(Littlewood and Strigini 2000; Wood, Belles et al. 2010) taken during system design 
and build). We believe that using our approach to challenge parts of safety cases in 
this way may be its most useful contribution. 
We shall illustrate the general approach via the real example of a safety-critical 
protection system discussed briefly in Section 1. The aim was to claim a pfd of 10-6 
for the two-channel system, each channel of which is software-based. The individual 
channel pfds are estimated conservatively at 10-4 and 10-2 respectively. The system 
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claim, 10-6, is then obtained by multiplying these two channel claims. In our private 
discussions with safety engineers and assessors, we understood that the reasoning 
here is that “modest” dependence between channel failures will be more than 
countered by the conservatism of the individual channel pfd claims: the claim of 10-6 
for the system pfd will then be conservative. 
We have already expressed our scepticism about such a trade-off. We now sketch out 
how the system claim of 10-6 might be supported by the kind of reasoning of Section 
2. In particular, we show how many failure-free demands of the system need to be 
observed to support the claim for different levels of doubt about “no worse than 
independence”, and different degrees of conservatism in the channel pfd claims.  
Table 1 shows the results of our analysis when the assessor believes the channel pfds 
are no worse than 10-4 and 10-3 respectively. For the three different values of an 
assessor’s doubt about NWTI, 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 respectively, the table shows the value 
of N for which the system pfd claim 10-6 can be supported. Thus, the number in bold 
for FAB(zAB(N)) in the second row of the table corresponds to N=43667, the smallest 
number of failure-free demands that allow a system pfd claim of better than 10-6 when 
the initial doubt is 0.10. These results are somewhat unforgiving: for the two most 
modest values of the doubt, the numbers of failure-free demands needed are rather 
high. This amount of operational testing may not be feasible for some applications. 
For example, it is an order of magnitude greater than what was feasible twenty years 
ago in the case of the Sizewell B PPS software (May, Hughes et al. 1995). However, 
there have been significant advances in computing speeds in the past twenty years, 
and much larger simulations are now possible: for example, 50,000 test cases may be 
generated as part of the assessment of the C&I functions of the UK’s proposed EPR 
(HSE 2011).  
For the smallest doubt, 0.01 represented by the last two lines of the table, on the other 
hand, only 1055 failure-free demands are required, and this does seem sufficiently 
modest to be feasible in many cases. 
 
 
 
Table 1 Required values of N (number of failure-free demands) to support a system pfd claim of 
10-6 for different values of initial assessor doubt dAB(0). Here pfdA=10-4, pfdB=10-3. 
 
Table 2 shows the results for a similar calculation when the channel pfds are no worse 
than 10-4.5 and 10-2.5 respectively. As in Table 1, these numbers are chosen so that their 
product – the “independence” case – is 10-7. The final row of the table shows that, in 
this case, no failure-free demands are needed to make the conservative claim that the 
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system pfd is better than 10-6: this claim can be made simply from the prior beliefs 
about the channel pfds when the doubt about NWTI is 0.01. 
 
 
 
Table 2 As Table 1, except pfdA=10-4.5, pfdB=10-2.5. 
 
Finally, in Table 3 the results are shown for a calculation in which the channel pfds 
are no worse than 10-5 and 10-2. Again the product – the “independence” case – has 
been chosen to be 10-7. 
 
 
 
Table 3 As Table 1, except pfdA=10-5, pfdB=10-2. 
 
In this case the required conservative system pfd claim of no worse than 10-6 can be 
made for values of dAB(0) of 0.01 and 0.05 a priori, i.e. without seeing any failure-free 
working. Even when the doubt is 0.1, the required number of failure-free system 
demands is only 10642, which is more modest than the numbers required for the 
examples of Tables 1 and 2. 
The results of Table 3 are less unforgiving than those of the other two tables. This 
seems to be because the channels are more asymmetric: channel A is much more 
reliable than channel B, and indeed pfdA is only a single order of magnitude short of 
the overall system goal of 10-6. Since the system pfd cannot be worse than the best 
channel pfd, quite modest confidence in NWTI means that the contribution from the 
second channel is sufficient to make the expected system pfd smaller than the required 
10-6. 
These numbers are, of course, merely illustrative. They are intended to give the reader 
some feel for the trade-offs that are likely between “independence doubt”, channel 
pfds, and extensiveness of failure-free testing.   
All the results above are obtained numerically: there is no closed form expression for 
FAB (zAB (N )) . An alternative approach to the one above allows exact closed form 
results. It involves a kind of backward reasoning, in which an assessor – say a 
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regulator – begins with a prior subjective doubt, say D, about NWTI, based on his 
review of the diversity-seeking practices adopted during the system development. 
That is  
P(PFDAB > pfdA × pfdB ) ≤ D                 (10) 
We assume that the system pfd requirement is PAB, arising from the wider safety case, 
i.e. 
E(PFDAB | N  failure-free demands) ≤ PAB               (11) 
Then it can be shown that the upper bound on the prior doubt about NWTI required to 
satisfy (11) is 
dreq =
1
1+ zAB (N )−PABPAB − pfdA × pfdB
×
1− zAB (N )
1− pfdA × pfdB
#
$
%
&
'
(
N              (12) 
where 
zAB (N ) =min(pfdA, pfdB, zm )                 (13) 
and 
zm =1− 1−
1
N +1
"
#
$
%
&
'(1−PAB )  
Here zAB(N) is the upper point of support of the 2-point distribution that is the most 
pessimistic prior (the other point of support being pfdA × pfdB ), as before. This upper 
point of support will be zm when this is smaller than each of the channel pfds. For any 
given channel pfds, this will happen when N is large enough, specifically when N>NC, 
where 
NC =
1−min(pfdA, pfdB )
min(pfdA, pfdB )−PAB
                  (14) 
In that case 
dreq =
1
1+ 1−PABPAB − pfdA × pfdB
×
1−PAB
1− pfdA × pfdB
#
$
%
&
'
(
N
× 1+ 1N
#
$
%
&
'
(
−N
×
1
N +1
             (15) 
For proofs, and details of closed form expressions for dreq, see Appendix.  
All this might be used in a two-stage procedure as follows. An assessor, such as a 
regulator, having arrived at a probability D that represents his prior doubt about 
NWTI, would compute dreq (based on the known values of pfdA, pfdB, N and PAB) and 
compare this with D. If dreq<D he would reject the claim PAB, (11). If dreq≥D he would 
accept the claim. 
Tables 4, 5, 6 show examples, continuing the example introduced in Section 1. As 
before, the system pfd requirement is 10-6, and the channel pfds have been chosen in 
each row of each table to give a product of 10-7 in the spirit of “conservatism about 
channel claims”. In the first column of each table, the successive values of pfdA from 
the top are 10-2, 102.2, 10-2.4, … , 10-5; the values of pfdB are in the same range, but 
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starting from the bottom, so that for each row pfdA × pfdB =10−7 . The three tables 
differ in the number, N, of failure-free demands observed. 
The tables show clearly the way in which asymmetry in the channel pfds aids the 
assessment: the more asymmetric these are, all things being equal, the greater the 
prior doubt about NWTI can be, whilst still allowing the claim about the system pfd. 
Thus in Table 4, the greatest doubt that can be allowed occurs when pfdA=10-2, 
pfdB=10-5 (or vice-versa). Similar results apply in Tables 5 and 6 although, for these 
larger values of N, the differences between the largest allowable doubt and the 
smallest, over the range of values of the channel pfds, is less pronounced.  
Notice that the value of dreq for large values of N, (15), depends on the channel 
probabilities of failure on demand, pfdA and pfdB, only via their product. The extent to 
which this product is smaller than PAB can be thought of as representing the degree of 
conservatism in the system pfd claim, compared with an over-optimistic claim of 
certain independence of channel failures. This is similar to the informal reasoning we 
reported in Section 1, but in our more formal treatment, the system claim is 
guaranteed to be conservative (for the assessor’s particular level of doubt about 
NWTI).  
In Table 4, the central rows all have dreq=0.024. That is because for these values of the 
channel pfds, N=10000 is sufficiently large to satisfy (14) – i.e. zm is smaller than each 
channel pfd – and so in (15) dreq depends on the individual channel pfds only via their 
product, which is 10-7 in each row. This effect is even more pronounced in Tables 5 
and 6, in which N is larger. 
 Examples 4
pfdA pfdB PAB N dreq
0.01 1e-05 1e-06 10000 0.099
0.006309573 1.584893e-05 1e-06 10000 0.066
0.003981072 2.511886e-05 1e-06 10000 0.046
0.002511886 3.981072e-05 1e-06 10000 0.033
0.001584893 6.309573e-05 1e-06 10000 0.026
0.001 1e-04 1e-06 10000 0.024
0.0006309573 0.0001584893 1e-06 10000 0.024
0.0003981072 0.0002511886 1e-06 10000 0.024
0.0002511886 0.0003981072 1e-06 10000 0.024
0.0001584893 0.0006309573 1e-06 10000 0.024
1e-04 0.001 1e-06 10000 0.024
6.309573e-05 0.001584893 1e-06 10000 0.026
3.981072e-05 0.002511886 1e-06 10000 0.033
2.511886e-05 0.003981072 1e-06 10000 0.046
1.584893e-05 0.006309573 1e-06 10000 0.066
1e-05 0.01 1e-06 10000 0.099
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Table 4: Values of dreq, i.e. prior doubt about NWTI, that must not be exceede  in order to 
support a system pfd claim of 10-6 after seeing 10,000 failure-free demands, for different values 
of the channel pfds (where, in each case, the product of the channel pfds is 10-7). Here 
zm=1.0099e-04. 
Conservative bounds for the pfd of a 1-out-of-2 system 13 
 
 
 Examples 5
pfdA pfdB PAB N dreq
0.01 1e-05 1e-06 50000 0.141
0.006309573 1.584893e-05 1e-06 50000 0.118
0.003981072 2.511886e-05 1e-06 50000 0.113
0.002511886 3.981072e-05 1e-06 50000 0.113
0.001584893 6.309573e-05 1e-06 50000 0.113
0.001 1e-04 1e-06 50000 0.113
0.0006309573 0.0001584893 1e-06 50000 0.113
0.0003981072 0.0002511886 1e-06 50000 0.113
0.0002511886 0.0003981072 1e-06 50000 0.113
0.0001584893 0.0006309573 1e-06 50000 0.113
1e-04 0.001 1e-06 50000 0.113
6.309573e-05 0.001584893 1e-06 50000 0.113
3.981072e-05 0.002511886 1e-06 50000 0.113
2.511886e-05 0.003981072 1e-06 50000 0.113
1.584893e-05 0.006309573 1e-06 50000 0.118
1e-05 0.01 1e-06 50000 0.141
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Table 5: As Table 4, but N=50,000, and zm=2.1e-05. 
 Examples 6
pfdA pfdB PAB N dreq
0.01 1e-05 1e-06 1e+05 0.212
0.006309573 1.584893e-05 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
0.003981072 2.511886e-05 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
0.002511886 3.981072e-05 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
0.001584893 6.309573e-05 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
0.001 1e-04 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
0.0006309573 0.0001584893 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
0.0003981072 0.0002511886 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
0.0002511886 0.0003981072 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
0.0001584893 0.0006309573 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
1e-04 0.001 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
6.309573e-05 0.001584893 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
3.981072e-05 0.002511886 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
2.511886e-05 0.003981072 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
1.584893e-05 0.006309573 1e-06 1e+05 0.211
1e-05 0.01 1e-06 1e+05 0.212
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Table 6: As Table 4, but N=100,000 and zm=1.1e-05. 
 
There is an obvious interplay here between channel pfd asymmetry and the size of N: 
high asymmetry essentially means that one of the pfds is very small, and NC in (14) is 
thus large. So, in Table 4, where N is of quite modest size, the “best” – i.e. the largest 
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– acceptable doubt is a factor of four greater than that where the channel pfds are 
approximately equal in size.  
In Table 6, in contrast, N is sufficiently large that for almost all values of the channel 
pfds it is greater than NC and so dreq takes the same value in almost all cases. That is, 
channel asymmetry cannot be exploited here to increase allowable doubt in NWTI. 
Or, putting it more positively, for such large N there is no need to have one channel 
very much more reliable than the other to gain benefit in the size of dreq. 
Tables 7, 8, 9 show similar results in a case where there is greater conservatism in the 
channel pfd claims: here the product is 10-8 in contrast to the 10-7 of the previous 
tables.  
 Examples 4.2.1
pfdA pfdB PAB N dreq
1e-03 1e-05 1e-06 10000 0.10838
6.3096e-04 1.5849e-05 1e-06 10000 0.072454
3.9811e-04 2.5119e-05 1e-06 10000 0.050118
2.5119e-04 3.9811e-05 1e-06 10000 0.036589
1.5849e-04 6.3096e-05 1e-06 10000 0.02909
1e-04 1e-04 1e-06 10000 0.026462
6.3096e-05 1.5849e-04 1e-06 10000 0.02909
3.9811e-05 2.5119e-04 1e-06 10000 0.036589
2.5119e-05 3.9811e-04 1e-06 10000 0.050118
1.5849e-05 6.3096e-04 1e-06 10000 0.072454
1e-05 1e-03 1e-06 10000 0.10838
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Table 7: Similar to Table 4, but with the channel pfds in each row having a product of 10-8, i.e. 
there is greater conservatism in the channel pfd claims. 
 Examples 5.2.1
pfdA pfdB PAB N dreq
1e-03 1e-05 1e-06 50000 0.15345
6.3096e-04 1.5849e-05 1e-06 50000 0.12831
3.9811e-04 2.5119e-05 1e-06 50000 0.12387
2.5119e-04 3.9811e-05 1e-06 50000 0.12387
1.5849e-04 6.3096e-05 1e-06 50000 0.12387
1e-04 1e-04 1e-06 50000 0.12387
6.3096e-05 1.5849e-04 1e-06 50000 0.12387
3.9811e-05 2.5119e-04 1e-06 50000 0.12387
2.5119e-05 3.9811e-04 1e-06 50000 0.12387
1.5849e-05 6.3096e-04 1e-06 50000 0.12831
1e-05 1e-03 1e-06 50000 0.15345
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Table 8: As Table 7, but with N=50000. 
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 Examples 6.2.1
pfdA pfdB PAB N dreq
1e-03 1e-05 1e-06 100000 0.23001
6.3096e-04 1.5849e-05 1e-06 100000 0.22906
3.9811e-04 2.5119e-05 1e-06 100000 0.22906
2.5119e-04 3.9811e-05 1e-06 100000 0.22906
1.5849e-04 6.3096e-05 1e-06 100000 0.22906
1e-04 1e-04 1e-06 100000 0.22906
6.3096e-05 1.5849e-04 1e-06 100000 0.22906
3.9811e-05 2.5119e-04 1e-06 100000 0.22906
2.5119e-05 3.9811e-04 1e-06 100000 0.22906
1.5849e-05 6.3096e-04 1e-06 100000 0.22906
1e-05 1e-03 1e-06 100000 0.23001
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Table 9: As Table 7, but with N=100,000. 
 
3.1 Some observations arising from these examples 
From a practical viewpoint an important question is how best to build (and test) a 
system so that the resulting dreq is larger than D. It seems that asymmetry of the 
channel pfds might be helpful here. However, since this essentially means that one of 
the channel pfds needs to be close to the required system pfd, it may not be a practical 
proposition in cases where very high system reliability is needed. In fact, such 
asymmetry goes against the spirit of this kind of fault tolerance, which is to build 
highly reliable systems from channels of only modest reliability. 
The other factors affecting dreq are the conservatism of the system pfd claim (i.e. how 
much it differs from the too-optimistic simple product of the channel pfds), and the 
number of (failure-free) test cases observed. A comparison between Tables 4-6 and 
Tables 7-9 indicates the advantage, in terms of larger dreq, when there is greater 
conservatism (i.e. when the product of the channel pfds is 10-8 rather than 10-7). 
Table 10 summarises the interplay between the product pfdA × pfdB , N and dreq: 
different levels of conservatism ( pfdA × pfdB = 10-7, 10-7.5, 10-8), to support the same 
system pfd claim of 10-6, are shown against their corresponding values of the doubt in 
NWTI needed for different values of N. 
Readers might well ask at this stage whether this new approach could be used in 
practice for the assessment of real systems, bearing in mind that for safety critical 
applications the system pfd requirement may be a stringent one. The numerical value 
of PAB used in our examples here is, as we have said, one that we know to be the 
requirement for a real critical system. The issue then is whether the numbers in the 
tables above are plausible ones to be part of a safety assessment to support a claim of 
this magnitude. That is, for a particular instance (i.e. a row of one of the Tables 4-9): 
Are the required pfdA, pfdB achievable (and assessable)? Is the number of tests, N, 
feasible? And, most importantly, is it believable that the assessor’s doubt D in NWTI 
is smaller than that required, dreq? 
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pfdA × pfdB  PAB N dreq 
1e-7.0 
1e-7.5 
1e-8.0 
1e-6 
1e-6 
1e-6 
10000 
10000 
10000 
0.099 
0.106 
0.108 
1e-7.0 
1e-7.5 
1e-8.0 
1e-6 
1e-6 
1e-6 
50000 
50000 
50000 
0.141 
0.15 
0.153 
1e-7.0 
1e-7.5 
1e-8.0 
1e-6 
1e-6 
1e-6 
100000 
100000 
100000 
0.212 
0.225 
0.230 
 
Table 10: Upper bounds on the prior doubt about NWTI required to support a system pfd claim 
of 10-6, for three different values of pfdA.pfdB, for three different values of N. 
 
Of course, such questions can really only be answered when there is specific evidence 
available about a particular system. However, we believe – somewhat tentatively – 
that it is reasonable to answer in the affirmative in some of the cases above. Take 
Table 9. Here there is considerable conservatism in the channel claims (product 
equals 10-8 versus a system claim of 10-6), so that an assessor’s doubt about NWTI can 
be as high as 23% and still allow him to accept the system claim. He can do this 
without appealing to channel asymmetry (i.e. an implausibly strong claim for one of 
the channels), because the middle row of the table shows that claims of 10-4 for each 
channel will be sufficient. Such claims seem relatively modest for channels that have 
been built to safety-critical standards: for example, they could be supported by 
feasible amounts of operational testing. The number of system test cases (100000) that 
need to be generated is large, of course. Whether this is feasible will depend on 
particular circumstances, but we note that for a real protection system it is proposed to 
generate 50000 test cases (HSE 2011). Notice, however, that even 100000 test cases 
is more than an order of magnitude fewer than would be needed to support the system 
pfd claim of 10-6 directly from a “black-box” test (Littlewood and Wright 1997). 
4 Discussion 
We have presented a new way of reasoning about the reliability of a 2-channel, 1-out-
of-2 software-based system that overcomes some of the objections that can be made 
about an earlier approach to the problem. This earlier approach can be characterized 
as follows: “We realize that an assumption of independence between failures (and 
thus a claim for system pfd that is the simple product of channel pfds) may be too 
optimistic, but we have compensated for that by making only very conservative 
claims for the channel pfds. The system pfd claim will thus be conservative.”  
We believe the work reported here captures the spirit of this informal reasoning, but 
does so in a way that is more rigorous. It gives a rigorous meaning to notions of 
“conservative”, and allows proper trade-offs to be made between the different model 
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parameters (prior doubt about NWTI, number of failure-free tests observed, product 
of channel pfds, system pfd claim). However, the attentive reader will have noticed 
that this new approach brings its own problems and some difficulties that need further 
thought. 
In the first place, we have assumed in the development of Section 2 that the channel 
probabilities of failure on demand, pfdA and pfdB, are known. In practice, of course, 
these probabilities will not be known with certainty. One way forward would be to 
use the ideas in (Bishop, Bloomfield et al. 2011), where it was shown how to obtain a 
conservative bound for the posterior mean of the pfd of a single system based on an 
assessor’s prior belief and the observation of some failure-free demands in 
statistically representative operational testing. Such bounds could be used by an 
assessor as if they were “true” pfds, in the knowledge that they will be conservative.  
The testing of the different channels to obtain these pfds would be carried out before 
the system testing required for the results of Sections 2 and 3. In the current model 
there is no further “learning” about these channel pfds from the system testing. That 
is, the likelihood function used in the Bayesian updating in Section 2 does not allow 
any updating of the assessor’s knowledge of his beliefs about the channel pfds. The 
evidence from the system testing is just that there have been no system failures in N 
tests, but the assessor does not know whether there have been individual channel 
failures. Informally, the Bayesian updating in Section 2 concerns only the channel 
failure dependence via the evolution of dAB(N) and zAB(N) as N increases, but not any 
evolution of the channel reliabilities. 
This may be realistic in some cases: for example, in the case of shut-down systems, 
when a preferred channel correctly causes shut-down, the other channel may not be 
invoked and so it may not be known if it would have failed to shut down on that 
demand. However, in many cases this view will be too restrictive, and the system tests 
will also give information about channel outcomes. In such cases it would be useful to 
extend the model to be able to take account of this information: this is an issue we 
plan to address in future work. In fact such an extended model may also allow greater 
confidence to be gained in NWTI: informally, seeing some single channel failures, 
but no system failures, may give greater confidence in the efficacy of the fault 
tolerance mechanism (albeit less confidence in the reliabilities of the channels). 
A major difficulty in this model, of course, centres upon the assessor’s prior doubt 
about no-worse-than-independence of channel failures. Is it reasonable to expect an 
assessor to be able to state a numeric value for D, and for this number to be genuinely 
meaningful, rather than simply an uninformed guess? Interestingly, in private 
discussions with safety engineers and regulators familiar with these kinds of multi-
channel systems we have found a willingness to express numerically their confidence 
about independence itself: e.g. “I am 90% confident that failures of these channels 
will be independent”. In supporting such claims the experts usually appeal to their 
detailed knowledge of the architectures of the target systems, and on how they were 
built.  
As we have argued here, claims about independence itself – a point on the 
dependence spectrum – do not seem realistic, and a better way to proceed is to make 
claims that are framed in terms of intervals, such as our “no worse than 
independence”. It is interesting to ask whether the same experts would be able to 
support these claims using evidence from system architectures, and details of the 
Conservative bounds for the pfd of a 1-out-of-2 system 18 
 
 
design and build processes. Using such evidence to support probabilistic measures of 
doubt, as is required here, may not be easy.  
Because of these difficulties, we think that the most plausible use for our work might 
lie in providing challenges to claims based upon the kind of informal “trade-off” 
arguments we criticized in Section 1. Such a challenge might be of the following 
form: “You say that your channel pfd claims are pessimistic by these amounts, and 
that you have seen this number of representative failure-free test cases, it follows that, 
to support your system pfd claim, your doubt in NWTI needs to be smaller than this 
number.” That is, our work can be seen as a way of ‘policing’ assessor claims by 
revealing what is needed to be believed in order to support a system claim: such 
required beliefs may be unreasonable in the view of, say, a nuclear regulator, and thus 
open the claim to rejection.  
Of course, it would help to have empirical evidence of the levels of dependence 
between diverse software-based channels in some real-life systems. Unfortunately, 
such evidence is very thin on the ground. However, a single data point comes from the 
multi-version experiment conducted by Knight and Leveson (Knight and Leveson 
1986). There the null hypothesis of NWTI was not rejected for 139 out of 162 pairs of 
versions. That is, the estimated doubt in NWTI for a randomly selected pair was 0.142 
(Povyakalo and Littlewood 2010) which compares favourably with the 0.23 doubt in 
the discussion of the previous section. It has to be said, though, that the problem 
addressed here was not comparable to a real safety-critical application, such as a 
protection system, and the versions were not developed under the kind of conditions 
that might be expected of such applications.  
Ideally, we would like to have empirical evidence of the channel dependencies 
achieved in real systems. We are not aware of such evidence being available 
currently, in spite of several well-known multi-channel software-based systems 
having received extensive operational exposure. What is needed is that channel “vote-
outs” be recorded in those situations where there is no system failure (as well as when 
there is system failure, of course). We are not aware that this is done as a matter of 
course in any existing systems, and have seen no published data of this kind.  
Even if such data were available, across many disparate safety-critical systems in 
operation, there would be difficulties in an assessor using them to make a judgment 
about his confidence in NWTI for a particular novel system, since this new one may 
differ in significant ways from the previous ones.  
However, in some industries, there may be considerable experience in building 
“similar” systems in the past: e.g. protection systems. Let us assume that these earlier 
systems have been successful, in the sense that they were accepted as sufficiently safe 
to be deployed, and these judgments were not overruled by operational experience. 
An assessor could retrospectively compute dreq for each of these previous systems. It 
might then be conservative for him to use, say, the smallest of these numbers as his 
prior doubt, D, for a novel system. Such a choice could be regarded as ensuring that 
the procedure for assuring the safety of a new system was no worse – i.e. no less 
stringent – than that adopted historically. 
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Appendix
Finding a worst case prior distribution
Statement
Let P be the system pfd treated as a random variable with density f(p),
where 0  p  z0  1.
Here we show that
E(P | N failure free demands) =
1 
R z0
0 (1  p)N+1f(p)dpR z0
0 (1  p)Nf(p)dp

1  (1  p1)
N+1(1  x) + (1  p2)N+1x
(1  p1)N (1  x) + (1  p2)Nx (A1)
where
0  p1  y  p2  z0 (A2)Z y
0
f(p)dp = 1  x.
and the bound (A1) is reached with the two-point prior probability distri-
bution of P :
Prob(P = p1) = 1  x;
Prob(P = p2) = x;
Lemma
If q is a positive random variable and N is a positive integer, then
[E(qN+1)]
1
N+1   [E(qN )] 1N
Proof If x   0 and a   1 the function f(x) = xa is convex, so, by Jensen’s
inequality
E(xa)   (E(x))a (A3)
Substituting x = qN and a = N+1n into (A3):
E(qN+1)   [E(qN )]N+1N
which implies
[E(qN+1)]
1
N+1   [E(qN )] 1N
QED
i
Proof of the statement
Let us introduce four (unknown) values p1, p2, p3, p4
p1 = 1 
 R y
0 (1  p)N+1f(p)dp
1  x
! 1
N+1
p2 = 1 
 R z0
y (1  p)N+1f(p)dp
x
! 1
N+1
p3 = 1 
 R y
0 (1  p)Nf(p)dp
1  x
! 1
N
p4 = 1 
 R z0
y (1  p)Nf(p)dp
x
! 1
N
Obviously,
0  p1, p3  y
y  p2, p4  z0
In accordance with the lemma
p1  p3 (A4)
p2  p4 (A5)
because
1  p1 = (E((1  P )N+1 | P  y))
1
N+1
1  p3 = (E((1  P )N | P  y)) 1N
1  p2 = (E((1  P )N+1 | P > y))
1
N+1
1  p4 = (E((1  P )N | P > y)) 1N
We can now use the values p1, p2, p3, p4 to write down an expression for
E(P | N successful runs)
E(P | N successful runs) =
1 
R z0
0 (1  p)N+1f(p)dpR z0
0 (1  p)Nf(p)dp
= (A6)
1 
R y
0 (1  p)N+1f(p)dp+
R z0
y (1  p)N+1f(p)dpR y
0 (1  p)Nf(p)dp+
R z0
y (1  p)Nf(p)dp
=
1  (1  p1)
N+1(1  x) + (1  p2)N+1x
(1  p3)N (1  x) + (1  p4)Nx
ii
Applying (A4) and (A5) to (A6), we finally obtain the following upper
bound
E(P | n successful runs) 
1  (1  p1)
N+1(1  x) + (1  p2)N+1x
(1  p1)N (1  x) + (1  p2)Nx (A7)
and the bound (A7) is obviously reached when one chooses the two-point
prior distribution of P :
Prob(P = p1) = 1  x;
Prob(P = p2) = x;
0  p1  y  p2  z0  1.
QED
Finding p1 and p2
The unknown values p1 and p2 are found as a solution of two-dimensional
optimisation problem
F (p1, p2) =
(1  p1)N+1(1  x) + (1  p2)N+1x
(1  p1)N (1  x) + (1  p2)Nx ! min
subject to constraints:
0  p1  y;
y  p2  z0.
In general, p1 and p2 may di↵er from y and z0.
However,
@F
@p1
=  (1  p1)N 1(1  x)⇥
(1  p1)N+1(1  x) + (N(p2   p1) + 1  p1)(1  p2)Nx
((1  p1)N (1  x) + (1  p2)Nx)2  0,
because (A2) implies p1  p2.
Thus, F (p1, p2) reaches its minimum when p1 = y.
Using the following substitution, we obtain the result in the main body of
the paper for a ”1-out-of-2” system with known pfdA, pfdB and P (pfdAB >
pfdApfdB) = dAB(0),
p1 = y = pfdA · pfdB;
p2 = zAB(N);
z0 = min(pfdA, pfdB);
x = dAB(0).
iii
Finding required prior doubt dreq
The problem
Here, we aim at finding the required prior doubt dreq, satisfying
PAB = 1  (1  dreq)(1  pfdA · pfdB)
N+1 + dreq(1  z)N+1
(1  dreq)(1  pfdA · pfdB)N + dreq(1  z)N , (A8)
where
pfdA · pfdB  z  min(pfdA, pfdB) (A9)
and z minimises function FAB(u):
FAB(u) =
(1  dreq)(1  pfdA · pfdB)N+1 + dreq(1  u)N+1
(1  dreq)(1  pfdA · pfdB)N + dreq(1  u)N ,
given the parameters PAB, pfdA, pfdB and N are known.
Notation
Let us denote
z0 = min(pfdA, pfdB) (A10)
y = pfdA · pfdB (A11)
E(z) = (1  dreq)(1  y)N+1 + dreq(1  z)N+1
D(z) = (1  dreq)(1  y)N + dreq(1  z)N
FAB(z) =
E(z)
D(z)
(A12)
Finding z
In order to find z, we need the following derivatives and function G:
E0(z) =  (N + 1) · dreq · (1  z)N
D0(z) =  N · dreq · (1  z)N 1
G(z) = E0(z) D0(z)FAB(z) = (A13)
 ((N + 1)(1  z) +NFAB(z))(1  z)N 1;
F 0AB(z) =
E0(z)D(z)  E(z)D0(z)
D(z)2
=
G(z)
D(z)
(A14)
Thus, in accordance with (A13) and (A14), every stationary point z0 of
FAB(z) satisfies the equation
(N + 1)(1  z0) NFAB(z0) = 0.
iv
If FAB(u) reaches the required minimum 1  PAB at a stationary point
z0 within the segment [y, z0], then
z0 = 1 
✓
1  1
N + 1
◆
(1  PAB)  z0. (A15)
Otherwise, if, z0 > z0, then
(N + 1)(1  z0) N(1  PAB)   0, (A16)
and FAB(z) reaches the required minimum 1 PAB at the end z = z0 of the
segment [y, z0] , because FAB(y) = 1  y   PAB.
Therefore,
z = min(z0, z
0). (A17)
Inequality (A16) can be re-written as following
N  1  z0
z0   PAB . (A18)
Finding dreq
Now, let’s denote
w =
1  dreq
dreq
=
1
dreq
  1,
re-write (A8) as following
1  PAB = w(1  pfdA · pfdB)
N+1 + (1  z)N+1
w(1  pfdA · pfdB)N + (1  z)N ,
and solve it with respect to w
w =
z   PAB
PAB   y
✓
1  z
1  y
◆N
,
Thus, finally
dreq =
1
1 + z PABPAB y
⇣
1 z
1 y
⌘N ,
because
dreq =
1
1 + w
v
Finding a closed form for dreq
In accordance with (A10), (A11), (A17) and (A18), if
N  1 min(pfdA, pfdB)
min(pfdA, pfdB)  PAB ,
then z = z0 = min(pfdA, pfdB) and
dreq =
1
1 + min(pfdA,pfdB) PABPAB pfdA·pfdB
⇣
1 min(pfdA,pfdB)
1 pfdA·pfdB
⌘N .
If
N >
1 min(pfdA, pfdB)
min(pfdA, pfdB)  PAB ,
then z = z0
dreq =
1
1 + z
0 PAB
PAB y
⇣
1 z0
1 y
⌘N . (A19)
Equality (A17) implies
1  z0 =
✓
1  1
N + 1
◆
(1  PAB) =
✓
1 +
1
N
◆ 1
(1  PAB). (A20)
and
z0   PAB = (1  PAB)  (1  z0) = (1  PAB) 1N + 1 . (A21)
Substituting (A11),(A20) and (A21) into (A19), we finally get
dreq =
1
1 + 1 PABPAB pfdA·pfdB
⇣
1 PAB
1 pfdA·pfdB
⌘N ⇣
1 + 1N
⌘ N
1
N+1
.
Summary
Thus, we have shown that:
1. If
N  1 min(pfdA, pfdB)
min(pfdA, pfdB)  PAB ,
then
dreq =
1
1 + min(pfdA,pfdB) PABPAB pfdA·pfdB
⇣
1 min(pfdA,pfdB)
1 pfdA·pfdB
⌘N .
2. If
N >
1 min(pfdA, pfdB)
min(pfdA, pfdB)  PAB ,
then
dreq =
1
1 + 1 PABPAB pfdA·pfdB
⇣
1 PAB
1 pfdA·pfdB
⌘N ⇣
1 + 1N
⌘ N
1
N+1
.
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